by the extent to which boards are able to monitor the actions of the CEO and, as with remuneration, it is typical that the board will proxy the CEO's ability by a measure of firm performance. Poorly performing CEO's should lose their jobs.
There is a perception in the business press that the typical length of service for CEOs within large UK companies has decreased in recent times 1 and, moreover, CEOs are experiencing shorter tenures due to a greater likelihood of being fired. 2 This increased risk of dismissal in the UK is in turn attributed to the ongoing reform of corporate governance arrangements that began with the Cadbury (1992) Report and continued in the review of board effectiveness by Higgs (2003) , whose recommendations were included in the revised version of the Combined Code (2003) . 3 It has also been suggested that an increase in shareholder activism and voting levels, as called for by the Hampel (1998) and Myners (2001 Myners ( , 2004 Reports, have contributed to a more demanding governance regime. It is argued that institutions have increasingly coordinated their behaviour to provide a more effective constraint on CEO actions (Leech 2003) . Indeed, the ability of shareholders in the UK to dismiss the board at a company meeting is envied by activists in the US (Monks and Minow 2004) .
Despite this, there is an increasing body of literature that has raised concerns about whether boards are willing or able to remove under-performing CEOs, even if these can 1 See, for instance, 'The art of the sweetly timed exit ', Financial Times, 19th Aug 2004. 2 As opposed to alternative modes of exit such as voluntary retirements. 3 Companies listed on the London Stock Exchange are expected to comply with, or explain their non-compliance with, the Combined Code (2003) .
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fired or retired? month year be identified (Lipton and Lorsch 1992, Jensen 1993) . Although boards are traditionally constituted as guardians of shareholder interests, they are likely to fail in this task if they have inadequate incentives to avoid the rational attempts by the CEO to capture or negate their influence. Indeed, boards have been accused of providing inefficient contracts, that are heavily weighted in favour of the CEO, because of the undue influence the latter has in the pay-setting process Fried (2003, 2004) ). Similarly, if the board gets 'captured' by the CEO the latter will become entrenched and difficult, if not impossible, to dismiss.
The extent to which policy measures are able to impact on the relative power of the CEO and shareholders is also disputed in the literature (Weisbach 2007) . If CEOs have the capacity to capture the remuneration and dismissals processes, it follows that efforts to reduce their power relative to the board might also be captured and rendered ineffective.
4
A less ambiguous impact of the reform process in relation to CEO tenure has been the reduction in contract length and of the notice period in a CEO's service contract.
Prior to the Cadbury (1992) and Greenbury (1995) Reports, contracts with 3 or even 5 year rolling notice periods were not uncommon. Moreover, contract termination provisions were typically opaque and often resulted in compensation payments that included forgone annual bonus opportunities, enhanced pension provision and an acceleration in the vesting of share options (Trade and Industry Select Committee 2003) . After
Greenbury, contracts were reduced and termination provisions curtailed to the point that, under the revised Combined Code (2003) , service contracts should provide for no C4 the economic journal month year more than 12 months' salary. There is empirical evidence that poor performance increases CEO turnover in US corporations from, inter alia, Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) , Dalton and Kesner (1985) , Friedman and Singh (1989) , Parrino (1997) , Audas, Dobson and Goddard (1999) and Brickley (2003) . The composition of the board of directors, both in terms of its size and insider-outsider ratio, has also been shown to impact the probability of CEO turnover (Weisbach 1988 , Boeker and Goodstein 1993 , Yermack 1996 ). An interesting finding in this literature is that CEO replacement decisions may have similar determinants across different corporate governance regimes. Kaplan (1994) and Kaplan and Minton (1994) found that CEOs in Japan and Germany, countries whose governance systems are traditionally characterised as involving long job tenure, were subject to similar influences to their Anglo-American counterparts.
Whilst such studies are instructive, there are good reasons to suspect that they are not telling the whole story. For example, it has been suggested that a CEO may use their control of information and board appointments to entrench themselves during their tenure, ensuring the board of directors becomes increasingly favourably disposed towards them (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003) . If this is true, then it is likely that the impact of performance on the probability of CEO exit will vary over time. An alternative hypothesis, which would also lead to a time varying impact of performance relates to imperfect monitoring: if the output of a CEO cannot be observed directly and must be inferred from the firm's results, then there will be some lag before a CEO is judged to 5 Note that, at the median, 12 months' salary is worth approximately double in real terms in 2005 compared to 1995 (Gregory-Smith 2007) . Nevertheless, this still means a substantial reduction in the total cost of removing a CEO has occurred over this period.
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C5 fired or retired? month year be under-performing. It is only after this period that a badly performing CEO will be removed from their position. Finally, as outlined above, it is widely conjectured that substantial changes to the governance environment in which CEOs have been operating will have affected exit probabilities.
In this paper we seek to examine these issues using a dataset which is unique in terms of its detail. It allows us to model the duration of CEO tenure and to ascertain the varying likelihood of CEO exit using a competing risks framework. This permits us to test between a number of the competing hypotheses outlined above by deriving the determinants of competing exit states for appointed CEOs . Section 1 gives an overview of the data, including a graphical inspection of the hazard rates before a more formal semi-parametric analysis is presented in Section 2. Section 3 of the paper concludes.
Data
The primary information used in this study is supplied by Manifest Information Services Over our sample period we observe 1179 CEOs working for 590 companies. Of these, The table also reflects the institutional changes over the period, with the percentage of insiders 8 falling steadily during the period ( Figure 2 ) and the percentage of nonexecutive directors rising.
9
There are a number of ways in which a CEO can leave their position, only one of which is dismissal. We conducted an electronic search of financial news archives and regulatory news service announcements in order to identify the circumstances under which the CEO left his/her position and so exited the sample. Information confirming 7 Total shareholder return reflects both the capital gain from the movement in the share price and income from dividends.
8 The percentage of insiders is defined as the proportion of the board that consists of executive directors and affiliated non-executive directors.
9 Some concern has been raised in the literature regarding the reliability of company own assessments (Lin, Pope & Young 2003 , Young 2000 . To examine whether our results are sensitive to this issue, we re-estimated the model using Manifest's assessment of independence, which differs only marginally to that suggested by Lin et al. (2003) . The measured impact of insiders is reduced in significance, but the results for the other covariates are not qualitatively different from the results given in the paper. These results are available from the authors on request. 
Insiders
Non−executive directors their departure was found in every case and, in all but 65, some explanation of their leaving was offered. This allowed us to split the exit events into 9 types, details of which are given in Table 2 .
Note that CEOs are rarely officially 'dismissed', with only 10 CEOs suffering this fate in the 10 years of the sample. In many cases it is suspected that face-saving descriptions are used, either to avoid further damage to the ousted executive's reputation or to facilitate the conclusion of negotiations over compensation. Therefore, care was required when classifying executive departures by exit state. However, where clear evidence was found to show that the CEO had been forced out of their position, the CEO was considered to have been 'ousted'.
A common occurrence during the sample period was that the roles of Chairman and Chief Executive were split, consistent with the post-Cadbury recommendation for best practice. We code these cases separately as 'internal change' since they do not appear to constitute a forced CEO exit. We also code separately those CEO exits arising from C8 C9 fired or retired? month year restructuring or change of control. 10 'Interim' appointments to the CEO's position generally arise as a consequence of the sudden departure of the previous CEO, when someone, most often the Chairman, steps in to fill the role of Chief Executive on a caretaker basis. As these appointments are temporary by definition we exclude them from our analysis.
In a small number of cases no clear reason was given for the departure of the CEO and we could find no clear evidence of either an ousting or an immediate appointment to another company. We put these into an 'unclassified' departure category. The absence of any press rumours of dismissal suggests these cases were not among the more egregious examples of CEO behaviour, but it is suspected this category includes departures from a number of causes, including changes of career, moves to private equity companies etc. This table illustrates that existing research on executive tenure is likely to suffer from two inter-related difficulties: first, CEOs resign for a variety of reasons some of which (e.g. being headhunted) may be associated with success, some (e.g. dismissal)
with failure and others (e.g. retirement) may have ambiguous performance associations.
This clearly requires any analysis to allow for different determinants for the alternative exit states. Datasets which do not distinguish between these competing events have distinct disadvantages to those, such as ours, that can. We now consider how best to model the duration of CEO tenure.
Duration analysis
In modelling the duration of CEO tenure, we will adopt the Cox (1972) proportional hazard model. A hazard based analysis is useful as our data contains both left truncation (as some CEOs began their tenure prior to the sample start date) and right censoring (as some CEOs have not completed their tenure by the end of the sample) both of which can be readily handled in this framework.
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Non-parametric analysis
Prior to estimation, we briefly present a graphical analysis of the hazard rate by exit type. To do so, we combine the possible exit types into three groups: Forced exits (dismissals and ousted), retirements (including remaining as Chairman) and other exits (headhunted, change of control and unclassified). for exit is retirement, though this probability steadily increases as time passes. The risk of being forced out rises steadily in the early years, peaks in the fifth year, and declines thereafter-eventually becoming the least likely exit state. Hence, once the CEO has completed 6 years, the most likely form of departure is retirement.
Since one might expect different influences to impact on the hazard rates for forced exit and retirement, Figure 4 examines the impact of firm performance. We would Figure 4 shows that TSR has an impact on the hazard of forced exit with the divergence between the bottom and top quartile performers increasing until year four and remaining higher until year 12. With respect to retirements, the lower quartile performers also have a marginally higher risk of exit up to year 10 or 11, which could reflect CEOs with disappointing performance retiring early.
To investigate the possibility that CEOs may be less likely to be ousted from 'captured' boards, Figure 5 compares the hazard rates of those CEOs who have an insider dominated board with those that have independent boards. As can be seen, the hazard for forced exits is consistently lower if a board is dominated by insiders. This is C12 C13 fired or retired? month year suggestive of an entrenchment effect. Although the effect is less obvious, the probability of early retirement is also less in dominated boards, also suggesting entrenchment.
Moreover, since the difference in the hazard between the dominated boards and the independent boards is greatest between years 9 and 12, this is consistent with the notion that it may take a number of years for a CEO to capture their board. 
All Exit States
Whilst the graphical analysis is indicative, many additional factors could be impacting on the probability of CEO exit. We therefore proceed with an econometric analysis.
In standard parametric survival analysis one needs to assume an explicit form for the C13 C14 the economic journal month year underlying hazard rate, which imposes restrictions on the range of allowable behaviour.
By contrast, the Cox (1972) proportional hazard model is a semi-parametric method which allows the estimation of the impact of a covariate without restricting the shape of the baseline hazard. This is convenient for our purposes since we have few priors concerning the form of the underlying baseline hazard. Under the Cox model, the hazard rate that the j'th CEO faces is multiplicatively proportional to the baseline hazard, λ 0 (t), that all CEOs face, modified by covariates x j (Cleves, Gould and Gutierrez 2002) . the co-variate has a statistically significant impact, as normal. However, for ease of interpretation, hazard ratios are reported, and thus a coefficient indicates the probability of exit compared to the baseline. A number greater than one indicates the hazard is increased, a number less than one indicates that it is decreased.
The null hypothesis of this paper is that poorly performing CEOs should be dismissed. In our regressions, the total shareholder return variables identify annual performance quartiles compared to the lower quartile performers in the FTSE 350 Index.
Even with all exit states bundled together, the impact of a low performance ranking is clear. The probability of exit for low to median performers is 76% that of the worst performers, whilst those in the upper quartile have a hazard that is only 46% of the 12 The Cox model only concerns itself with the ordering of failure times, not the distribution of failure times. The baseline hazard λ 0 is therefore left unestimated.
13 The model is estimated in STATA using the stcox command.
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The theoretical caveat to our null hypothesis is that the threat of dismissal is mitigated if the CEO is able to entrench themselves and capture the board. Table 4 shows that the insider variables are also important. Increasing the proportion of independent directors on the board by 20 percentage points, whilst holding the total number of directors the same, would result in an increase in the hazard rate of approximately 14%. In addition, CEO's with larger boards face lower hazard rates, with the results indicating that losing 4 directors from the board would increase the hazard rate by 33%. Age also has a positive impact of the probability of exit. 14 A 65 year old CEO has double the hazard rate of a 55 year old.
Boards which comprise a greater proportion of directors appointed during the tenure of the current CEO result in lower hazard rates. 15 The average length of service of the non-executive directors decreases the hazard, suggesting that a non-executive director does not become more rigorous at monitoring with experience, but rather the CEO carries more influence the longer the director serves in office.
The ownership structure of the firm may also be important in determining CEO turnover. To examine this, we include the difference between the equity holdings of the largest blockholder and those of the CEO. The results indicate that the higher the relative holdings of the blockholder, the more likely the CEO is to be forced from their position.
16
14 Age is entered as a squared term beginning at age 50. 15 In the UK, directors are appointed by the Nomination Committee, a subcommittee of the board, typically led by the chairman or a non-executive director. However, the CEO or other executive directors may also sit on this committee. The percentage of the Board appointed by the CEO variable is constructed by recording the proportion of the board appointed during the tenure of the CEO. This variable is a proxy for the friendliness of the board towards the CEO on the presumption that the CEO is unlikely to preside over the appointment of hostile board members.
16 A complete analysis of control in a public company requires more detailed knowledge of (at least the upper tail of) the distribution of voting shares, as in Leech (2001) .
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It is possible that the governance of the company modifies the effect that performance has on the likelihood of CEO exit. To investigate this, we interact board size, % insiders, % board appointed by the CEO and average non-executive tenure with the total shareholder return variables. The results are show in column b of Table 4 . None of these interactions are statistically significant and so the structural measures of entrenchment described above appear not to diminish the impact of performance on the likelihood of exit.
Competing risk estimates
By grouping all exit types together, the model presented in Tables 4 implicitly assumes the same underlying hazard rate across all failure types. However, as we have seen, there are good reasons to suspect that the baseline hazard is likely to vary depending on the event from which the CEO is at risk. For example, under an entrenchment hypothesis, one would expect the hazard of dismissal to reduce over the course of the CEO's tenure but the hazard of retirement will increase. One strategy, as used by Geddes and Vinod (1997) , is to exclude observations that experience the competing event and just analyze the event of primary interest, in this case dismissal. However, a more efficient and informative approach is to directly compare alternative exit states in a common framework. We therefore adopt a competing risks methodology (Prentice et al. (1978) , Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) ). The risks are competing in the sense that the exit states are mutually exclusive (i.e. upon retirement the CEO can no longer be dismissed) and thus each event censors each other event. We distinguish between three competing exit types: forced departures; retirements; and other exits. We follow the method of Lunn and McNeil (1995) Examining the competing risk estimates, a clear distinction can be observed in Table   5 with respect to the influence of covariates upon CEO turnover. Firm performance is critical in the hazard of a forced exit, with CEOs of firms in the top quartile having a hazard rate only 20% of that of the bottom quartile. In contrast, performance has a positive impact on exits to other states, presumably as high performers move on to other jobs. Table 5 shows that CEO's with a larger proportion of the board appointed during their tenure are at significantly lower risk of dismissal. Ceteris paribus, increasing the proportion of the board who have been appointed during the tenure of the CEO by 50 percentage points reduces the risk of dismissal by 40%. Boards comprising longer serving non-executive directors also reduce the risk of dismissal for the CEO.
As with the single risk estimates, we also interact the performance with the governance variables, but again these effects are largely insignificant. Therefore, we are unable to conclude that the impact of poor performance upon dismissals is reduced in weakly governed firms.
To summarise, we have provided evidence that poorly performing CEOs are at a greater risk of dismissal. We have also shown that governance matters: CEOs with larger boards, with more directors appointed during their tenure, with established non-C18 C19 fired or retired? month year 
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Performance Revelation vs Entrenchment
In the non-parametric analysis in section 2.1. we showed that the hazard of forced exit varied over a CEO's tenure, increasing until year 4 and declining thereafter. This is a pattern that we might expect to see under entrenchment. The hazard rate will decrease if the CEO captures the board, which might take the CEO a number of years. Now, even if shareholders desire to remove the CEO, they will have lower rates of success due to the increasingly entrenched position of the CEO.
However, Figure 3 also describes what we might expect to see with performance revelation. As information regarding the CEOs ability increases as a result of observing additional years of firm performance under their tenure, shareholders may become more willing to stick with the CEO, even if current performance is relatively poor. However, if the declining hazard is due to information revelation, we would additionally expect the impact of cumulative good past performance to make the CEO more secure. To this end, we additionally add the cumulative change in TSR ranking to our regressions.
17
We then allow the impact of the performance and insider variables to vary, by splitting our sample at 5 years of tenure.
18 Table 6 presents the results of this exercise.
Current performance, measured by total shareholder return does indeed appear to become less important after 5 years, as predicted by both the entrenchment and per-17 The cumulative change in TSR ranking captures performance in all years since appointment, assuming each year's performance is equally important.
18 We have experimented with break points at other tenures, but that at 5 years gives the model with the highest log-likelihood.
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C21 fired or retired? month year formance revelation hypotheses. Our reported estimates also show that the impact of insiders on the hazard of forced departures increases after the CEO has been in office for 5 or more years. This is consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis. No evidence is found for information revelation however-the coefficient on the change in TSR ranking moves in the opposite direction to that expected. This suggests that shareholders continue to regard recent, rather than good past, performance as the key indicator of CEO competence.
Governance Environment
As indicated in the introduction, the period of investigation was one of an ongoing programme of corporate governance reforms (Cadbury 1992 , Greenbury 1995 , Combined Code 1999 , Higgs 2003 Finally, if less obviously, there is a widespread perception that shareholder activism has increased over the period (Davies, Platts & Lewis 2008 Leech(2001 Leech( , 2003 suggests that effective voting control in many large UK companies could rest in the hands of a few fund managers if they co-ordinate their voting. Furthermore, the large absolute size of these holdings reduces their liquidity and thereby provides an incentive for intervention (Leech 2003) .
Following the Myners' Reports (2001 , 2004 institutional shareholders' organisations have acknowledged the role of fund managers in corporate governance (Davies et al. 2008, p2) .
Since changes in the governance environment have occurred progressively, but incrementally, over the period, we test for their impact by splitting our data at 2000
and labelling the sub-periods thereby created as 'pre-reform' and 'post-reform', respectively. The results of this exercise are given as Table 7 . We find supportive evidence of an increase in the importance of firm performance post-reform. In particular, the hazard of forced departure for the bottom quartile performers doubles between the two sub-periods, with a corresponding fall in the other exit states. There is some suggestive decline in the hazard for the top performing companies; although these changes are not significant.
The results for our governance variables suggest a rather limited impact of the reform process. Although the impact of insiders is weaker in the post reform period, the entrenching effect of board members appointed by the CEO appears to have increased.
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Conclusions
We have presented evidence that the threat of CEO dismissal responds to performance as measured by total shareholder return. We have also shown that the threat of dismissal falls with certain structural measures of entrenchment such as the proportion of insiders on the board or number of directors appointed during the CEO's tenure. However, we were unable to find a strong interaction between governance conditions and the impact of performance in determining the threat of dismissal.
Our investigation has also exposed distinct differences between the hazard rates of competing risk types and in the variation of these hazard rates over time. Whilst the risk of retirement increases steadily throughout the CEO's tenure, the risk of an exit under pressure from the board and/or shareholders only increases to year four, after which 
